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CHINA CAN WIN! 
BY WANG MING 
HE Japanese usurpen have started a new large- T scale military offensive against China The Chin- troop oEer armed resistance to Japanese - 
sion. China is in flames1 Actually a Sino-Japan= war 
an a scale never seen before has already begun. 
On July 7, 1937. the Japanese militarists suddenly at- 
tacked Lukouchiao and were heroidly repulsed by the 
37 th Division of the 39th Chinese Army. In order to gain 
time to bring up reserves and to conceal the true plans 
of its new military operations from pubIic opinion, the 
Japanese militarists hypocritially declared that the 
events at Lukouchiao were an "accidental," "local inci- 
dent." Howwer, subsequent facts have fully revealed the 
true purpose of the new offensive launched by the Jap 
anese aggressor in China. 
Tt tE  CAUSES OF THE NEW OFFENSfVE OF THE JAPANESE 
MUJTAIUSTS ON CHINA 
I t  has always k e n  the dream of the ruling dasses of 
imperialist Japan to establish their rule in China and 
compIetely to enslave the Chinese people. The history of 
the w i v e  actions of the Japanese imperialists in 
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China may be divided into the following four mail1 
stages: 
First stagefrom the SineJapanese war (1895) to the 
world imperialist war ((1914-1918). Zhlfing this time 
japan grabbed the Lui-Kiu Islands, Formam, &e Paca- 
dores Islands, the conmion in Kwangtung Region and 
Korea-lerritories &at were either a paxt of Ch' ~ n a  or
under Chineae rule. 
The second stag+hm the time of the world impe- 
rialist war to the events in Mukden on September 18, 
1931. In this perid  llle Japanese imperialists seized 
K i a d i o w  and Tsingtao (at the time German concessions 
in China), their troops advand on the city of Tsinan 
and on January 18, 1915, they presented Yuan Shih-kai 
with the d l e d  Twenty-one Demands, the satisfaction 
of which would have meant the virtual transformation 
of China into a Japneae colony. 
The third s t a g e - h  the Mukden events in lgg I to 
the events of Lukouchiao in July of the current year. 
During these six years the Japanese imperialists seiaed 
&me northeastern provinces (i.e., Manchuria) and part 
of the territory of m-alled Inner Mongolia (the entire 
province of Jehol and six counties of Northern Chahar). 
The seizure of Manchuria and Jehol by Japanese im- 
perialism was a terrific economic and political blow to 
China. 
The fourth stage begins with the Japanex attack on 
Lukoucbiao. The immediate and primary objective of 
this attack is the seizure of the 6ve northem provinces 
of China (Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi and Shan- 
tung). The seizure of thae five pmvincm would provide 
Japanese imperialism with rich sources of raw material 
and extensive marketa, such as never were known in the 
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history of the Japanese Empire. However, the rnifitary 
operations of the Japanese troops in the Shanghai-Naq- 
king district show that this time the Japanese aggreesor 
d m  not confine his plans to the northern provinces. 
The present military operations of Japanese imperial- 
ism, after the seizure of Manchuria and Jehol, signify a 
new stage in the execution of Tanaka's monsuoua plan 
for the complete absorption of China and p v t i o m  
for the seizure of lndia and Indo-China, the Philippine 
Islands* Indonesia and Australia, as well as preparations 
€or a "big war" against the U.S.S.R., the United States 
and Great Britain for the purpose of securing the world 
supremacy of a Pm-Japanese Empire. 
'To conquer the whole of China we must first seize 
Manchuria and Mongolia and !o conquer the whole 
world we must sehe the whole of China." This is the 
idea of General Tanaka which the Japanese fascist mili- 
tarists are now attempting to carry out. 
The open intervention of the German and Italian fas- 
I &t aggresom in Spain and the consequent aggravation 
.,of the aituation throughout Europe, the policy of actual 
toleration of W t  p i o n  which the British govern- 
ment pursues with reference to Ethiopia and Spain as 
well as to China, the position of waiting adopted by the 
government of the United States, the helplessness of the 
League of Nations in the face of the fascist war incen- 
diaries, the formation of an alIiance between Japan, 
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C a m m y  and ltaly and, finally, the absence, so far, of 
real fighting unity of action on the part of the interna- 
tional proletariat, against fascism and war, as a result of 
I, 
I the rejection by the reactionary leaders of the Socialist 
IntemationaI of the proposals of the Cornintern-b 
are the basic facts in the pfese~t international situation 
'J 
which facilitate the fulfilment of the predatory plans of 
.@e Japanese fascist militarists and encourage them to 
undertake new aggressive operations in China. 
The rise of anti-war and anti-fascist sentiment among 
the working masses of Japan, the growth of conflicts 
between labor and capital, betwan the landlords and 
tenant peasants, the increasing financial dSculties and 
the rising discontent of the moderate section of the bour- 
geoisie with the adventurous policy of the fascist mili- 
tarists, who are leading the country to complete economic 
and military catastrophe--these are the facts of the situ- 
ation in Japan itself which prompt the Japan= mili- 
tarists to hasten their aggression on thk mainland. The 
fascist militaris~ are seeking by their military adventure 
against the Chinese people to arouse a fever of chauvin- 
ism, to divert the atkncion of the masses from the in- 
ternal situation in Japan and to establish martial law, 
so that they may ruthlessly mush the revolutionary move- 
ment and all qqmsitionist forces. 
The Japanese militarists are pushing their offensive 
on China for the purpose of d i n g  the constantly 
growing anti-Japanese momnent of the Chinese people. 
They have set themselves the task of destroying the cen- 
tral Nanking g o v m n t ,  of smashing the forces of the 
united national anti-Japanese Iront and destroying iu; 
main participants, the Kuomintang and the Communist 
Party of China. They want to behead and disorganize the 
resistance of the Chinese people, in order to make China 
their colony. 
However, we may confidently say that the braxen ag- 
gressors have miscalculatedl China today is no long- 
what it was at the time of the Manchurian events. The 
C h i n e  people are prepared to ofl6er determind resist- 
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ance to the Japanese militarists. This is shown by the 
ment declarations of the head of the Nanking govern- 
ment and Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese army, 
Chiang Kai-shek, 
Referring to the evma at Lukouchiao, Chiang Kai- 
shek said in his speech at Kuling on July 17 that "the 
further development of the Lukou&iao events is a ques- 
tion of the life or death of China," and on July go in 
connection with the seizure of Peiping and Tientsin by 
the Japanese in an interview with the correspondent of 
the CentraI News Agency he de3ared: "Our whole 
people, seeing that the country is going through a miti- 
cal period, when our very existence is at stake, will fight 
to the end as one man." 
A portion of the Chinese troops and air fore  have 
already begun national defensive miIitary operations in 
Shanghai, Hangchow, Nanking, Nan-& Hopei and 
Chahat against the Japanese a g p w t g .  A surilung proof 
of the indignation of the Chinese people and its readi- 
ness for decisive struggle with the -or is the fact 
that dl the organized anti-Japanese political and mili- 
taiy for= of the counuy began to unite with unheard 
of speed. Thus at the conference of national defense in 
Nanking to which, for the k t  time, along with all the 
prominent military leaders of the country, the Ieaders 
of the Red Army of China, Comrad~ Chu Teh, Mao 
Tsetung and Chow En-lai were invited, considmable 
p r v  was made as regards cooperation between the 
Kuomintang, the Communist Party and other organiza- 
tions. Actually the general mobilization of military form, 
including the Chinese anti-Japanese People's R d  Amy, 
for common struggle against the common national enemy 
has already started in China. 
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CAN CHfNA OFFER SU-FUL AIIMgD -ANCE 
TO J A P A ~ ~  ACGSUWON? 
The CommunL t Party of China gave a dear and &rm- 
ative answer to this quation in the first days of the Man- 
churian events. The overwhelming majority of the 
Chinese people share this standpoint. But many politid 
and mifitsuy men in China because of their "fear of 
Japan" and the iduence of pmJapanese dements for a 
long time opposed armed resistance to Japanme aggres- 
sion. To be sure, the advocates of this m l l e d  theory 
of non-resistance become fewer and fewer each day. 
However, the complete refutation of their arguments is 
an imparable part of the general struggle to oqpnia 
real military resistan= to the constantly increasing Jap- 
anese aggression. 
The adv-tes of the "theory of the impossibiiity of 
China winning'' in an armed struggle with Japan main- 
tain that Chin3 which is weak from the standpoint of 
military technique and idustry, is as yet unprepared 
for armed resistance to a foreign enemy. If China at- 
tempts armed resistan= to the Japanese aggmwr it wilt 
inevitably share the fate of Ethiopia or, at k t ,  of Spain. 
While arguing in this fashion they deliberately gloa 
over the tremendous difFerence that exists between China 
and Ethiopia or even Spain, Erom the standpoint of the 
forces and resources the country p m e s e  for the strugglc 
against &he usurper. 
It is true that China is weak Erom the standpoint oi 
military technique and industry and for this very reason 
all the great and even the small capitalist countries beat 
us. The leader of all peoples, Stalin, emphasized this 
weakness of China's in his report on the results of the 
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First Five-Year Plan. Comrade Stalin said h a t  without . 
industrialization the sinration of the US.S.R. would be 
mare or less analogous to the present wition of China, 
"which has no heavy industry, has no war industry of its 
own and which is pecked at by everybody who cares to 
do so." The Chinese Communists well redhe that the 
level of heavy industry and the military-technical equip 
ment of the army are of tremendous importance in md- 
ern warfare. But at the same time, as Marxist-Leninists, 
they recognize the truth, tested by history, that the out- 
come of war is decided by living people in the h a 1  
analysis. 
In order to offer armed resistan= to Japanese impe- 
rialism which is armed to the teeth, China must prepare. 
But how? The advocates of "the impossibility oE China 
winning" reduce this question merely to the pu- of 
arms abroad and the increase of armamem pduction 
within the country, for in their opinion until China shall 
possess the same armaments as her adversary she cannot 
offer successful armed mistance to the aggrmor. 
The re-arming of China is of course newssary, but 
arguments that China cannot resist JapatEW aggression 
until China's armaments correspond to those of Japan 
are utterly wrong and harmful. They are wrong for the 
very reason that China lags far behind Japan in this re- 
spect and the latter will not allow China calmly to catch 
up with her. The seintte by the Japanese aggressors oi 
vast territories in Manchuria and Jehol, with their tre- 
mendous riches and resources, has already dealt a severe 
blow to China's defenses and now if China were to lose 
the five nonhern provinces in addition, as well as the 
Shanghai-Nanking area, its capacity to defend itself 
would be enormoudy reduced. 
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What does the i s  of Manchuria, JehoI and the five 
northern provinces mean for China's defenses? It means 
the loss of over one-fourth of total population, over one- 
fifth the entire territory, nine-tenths of all the imn ore 
depits ,  twethirds of all the railways, four-fifths of a11 
the coal mines and one-half of the total md deposits, 
one-half of the entire production of salt. Obviously, if 
China cannot defend these rich provinces from Japanese 
mupatian, she not only will deliver a huge portion of 
her populatio~i to the mercy of Japanese barbarian&. She 
not only will lose atcmive territory that will faditate 
hostile military operations. She not only will surrender 
her rich deposits of coal, iron-ore and salt  and her rail- 
ways into the hands of her mortal enemy. She wiIl at the 
stme time be totally deprived of sources of raw material 
and the prerequisites for the development of her heavy 
and war industry. 
Furthermore what would cbe loss of ~h&hai mean 
to China? Lt would not only mean the loss of the biggest 
economic, industrial, political and cuItura1 city in the 
land, but also surrender to the enemy of the main mili- 
tary strategid center, It would mean opening the gate- 
way for the Japanese aggressor to all the rich districts 
on the Yangtse River. It would mean a permanent threat 
to Nanking, the capital of rbe Chinese republic. If the 
Chin- pople cannot defend the Shanghai-Nanking dis- 
trict the aggressor will strike at the very heart of China. 
We must dsa tell the advocates d the "impmibility 
of China winning" &at the purchase of a r m s  and the 
reception of wist  an@ from abroad largely depend on the 
powers of resistance and riches of China iuelf at the 
present time. It is a bitter truth of our times that no one 
considers the weak and those who do not defend them- 
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selves. And if aEter losing Jehol and Manchuria China 
loses its northern provinces, if it loses its important 
Shanghai-Nanking area, it will be weaker and poorer 
and then there will be less likelihood and opprtunity 01 
receiving l m s ,  arms and other forms of assista~ice from 
abroad. 
If, on the contrary, China now seriomly undertakes 
the armed struggle in defense of its territorial integrity 
and national independence, in the cnurse of the struggle 
it can re-arm itself bib wilh its own resources and 
through the purchase of arms abroad. The dearest p r d  
of this is the struggle of the heroic Spanish people against 
the fascist rebellion of Fmnw and the German-Italian 
intervention. The area of Spain is incomparably smaller 
than that of China; its population is twenty time% smaller 
than the population of China. 
As regards induslrial development Spain is one of the 
most badward countries in Europe. At the outset of iu 
military openitions against the fascia: rebels the republi- 
can government of Spain had only irregulax detachments 
consisting of poorly armed working people. However, as 
a result of the cornbind elforts of all the parties and 
organizations of the People's Front, and first and fore- 
most of the Communist Party of Spain, as a mulr of the 
solidarity and aid of the international proletariat and 
the democratic and anti-fascist forces, in the course of a 
year's a d  s t w I e  the Spanish Republic not only 
created a regular army of half a million but also suc- 
ceeded in providing this army with modern military 
equipment. And if the comparatively small Spanish Re- 
public managed to organize its army and acquire the 
necessary armaments in the course of armed struggh, 
why cannot the enormous Chinese Republic do likewise? 
If Republican Spain offers successful armed resistance 
to the combined fol-ces d fascist Italy and Germany, why 
a n n o t  vast China offer successful armed resistance to 
the armed forces d the single Japanese aggressor? For 
the Japanese aggressor, gave for his milirary technical 
advantage in the first period of the war, as regards the 
remaitring prerequisites for victory is inferior to the 
united narional forces of h e  Chinese people. 
'The advocates of the "impossibility of China winning'' 
imagine that the weaker the resistance to the foreign 
aggmmr the fewer the sacrifices fpr China. The imfuta- 
We Iacts of the history of Sino-Japanese relations mm- 
pletely disprove this conclusion of theirs. In 1895 China 
o f f d  a r ~ h d  resistance to Japanese aggression. Although 
China was defeated, her territorial losses were compara- 
tively small. 
In i91erg  the Chinese people offered determined 
oplmsition to Jzyanese aggression, as a result of which 
Japanese imperialism was unable to force China to agree 
to her enslaving Twenty-one Demands. In 1931, how- 
ever, the Nanking government pursued a policy of non- 
resistance in cotlnection with the Mukden events. As a 
result, in a short time Japan occupied the whole of Man- 
churia and following that, Jehol. This is the biggest terri- 
torial lnss that China has sufired in the last hundred 
yean* 
111 1939 the Chinese 19th and 5th Armies, together 
with the Shanghai proletariat and the ~ o b u n b t s ,  of- 
fered heroic resistance to the Japan* troop, as a result 
of which Cbim saved Shanghai from Japanese -pa- 
tion. In 1936 the Suiyuan and Shansi troops heroically 
npcllcd the so-called combined JapauseMongoIian- 
Manchurian tmops and as a result the aggresrsor 
' 5  
was fumed for a time to retreat from t b s e  provinca 
And now, in connection with the new big Japanese 
military invasion, China is faced with the aucial alms- 
rive of either seriously defending its national existence. 
which means life, or of not resisting Japanese -ion, 
which means death. The Chinew people must ch- 
one of the two possible coumes: they must either yield to 
the persuasions of th~se who maintain "the impossibility 
of China winning-take the course of non-resistance, for 
the alleged purpose of "avoiding excessive sacrifices," and 
thereby mcrifice the whole of China to the Japanese 
wutpefs, or else they must take the course of the Spanish 
people, and even at h e  cast of temporary and partial 
sacrifices, defend the territory and the riches that have 
not yet been lost, and reconquer the lwd and the portion 
of the people's wealth that has already been seized by 
the ag'gressor, save the working people of China from 
the barbarism of the Japanese fascist military clique, save 
the whole of the Chinese people from enslavement. 
In other words China must either defend and recon- 
quer everything at the cost of partial and temporary 
sacrifices or else on the pretext of "desiring to avoid big 
sacrifices" actually Iase everything, including national in- 
dependence, the people's freedom and the country's 
wealth. There is no middle course, 
Departing from the false assumption of "the i m p  
sibility of China winning" the a&-tes of the "theory 
of non-resistance" Further adduce considerations of an 
international: character. In their opinion the external 
pi t ion  of China is as yet unfavorable for armed re- 
sistance to the Japanese aggressor. 
Yes, the external position of China t h y  is not as bril- 
Iiant as we would like i t  lo be, from thestandpoint of our 
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country's defense. But Japan's position is no better than 
China's. The new Japanese aggression is not only a threat 
to the national existence of the Chinese people; it also 
menaces the interests of the United States, Great Britain 
and France. By its aggression Japan violates the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, the obligations of the Nine 
Power Pact and other international agmments; she 
facilitates the qgpmion of fascist Germany and Italy in 
Spain and throughmt Europe, she endangers the grn- 
era1 peaw. 
"The rriruatian is now developing in such a way tbat ro 
maintain pace ~hroughaut the world means Arst and fore- 
most ro bring about the defeat of the fascist invndcm in Spain 
and China.'" 
The aggravation of the external position of Japanese 
imperialism facilitates the struggle of the Chinese people. 
More than ever before, Japan is isolated in the interna- 
tional arena; her allies, the signatories of the so-cded 
antiamintern treaty-fascist Germany and I taly-are in 
no p i t i o n  to provide Japan with military assistance to 
the extent that they would if they were not invoIvd by 
their Intervention in Spain. It is unlikely that they will 
be able to extend war credits to Japan for they them- 
d v e s  are in just as bad financial straits as their fond ally. 
And the struggle of the Chinese people against the 
aggressor and war incendiary in the Orient, l k e  the strug- 
gle of the Spanish people against German a d  Italian 
fascism, is not only the cause of defending the country's 
own national existence and freedom. It is an integraI 
part of the struggle of the whole of advanced and p m  
m v e  mankind against fascism and war, for democracy 
Gcorgi Dimitroff, Faschm Is War, pp. la-18, Worker# Library 
Publishers, New York. 
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and peace. The solidarity and sympathy of the world p m  
letariat and of all honest, peace-loving and demmtic 
forces are on the side of the Chinex people. 
Consequently, neither the internal nor the interna- 
tional position of China gives grounds for the assertion 
made by the advmtes of the "theory of non-resistance" 
that China is in no position to oBer su&l armed 
resistance to J a p e s e  aggmsion. 
However, it by no means foLlows that the struggle of 
the Chinese people against the Japanese trggresisor is an 
easy matter, or that China's victory ia guaranteed ahead 
of time. The armed struggle of the Chinese people for 
the preservation of their national independence encoun- 
ters tremendous weaknesses and difficulties, which it will 
require tremendous &ort to overcome. 
The first basic difficulty arises from the far from ade- 
quate organization and-unity of the national forces of 
China. Although as a result of the constant struggle of 
the Communists and the masts, as well as of the efforts 
of the progressive eleme-nu within the Kuomintang, the 
internal war has recently ceased, and the p m  of the 
peaceful unifiation of all anti-Japan- national f m  
has begun, the extent of this mifiation is far from what 
is required for s u d u l  armed resistance to the foreign 
enemy. The m a n y - d o n d  Chinese people who corn- 
prhe one-6fth of all humanity will become invincible 
only when they are united and organized into one irre- 
aistible national force. 
The second basic d i i c d t y  in the armed struggle 
against the aggrasor arises horn China's military techni- 
cat backwardness. A1 though the Chinese troops display 
devotion and endurance in the battle with the foreign 
invaders and are greatly superior numerically to the 
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regular infantry divisions of Japan, they are far inEerior 
to their adversary h m  the standpoint of military tech- 
nical equipment. The Chinese air farce, despite the mn- 
siderable increase in the number of airplanes and the 
training of new heroic and skilled fliers, is not yet 
adequate 
The Chin= navy is weak both numerically and in 
quality. The strengthening of the naval forms Eor pur- 
poses of coastal defeme is one of the urgent fighting tasks 
of the Chinese people and the Nanking government. The 
C h i n e  troops and the civil population are almost un- 
prepared for chemical warfare while the crtanibaktic 
Japanese fascists have already begun to use poison gases 
agahst the Chinese people. 
Finally, in connmtion with the weak militaty teehnicaI 
equipment and lad of experience in modem warfare, 
the Chinese troops do not possess adequate military tech- 
n i d  experts. Although the experience of the Spanish 
Republic has shown that similar weakn- and dificul- 
ties may be overcome h the course of the war, they are 
most keenly felt in the k t  period of the fighting. 
The third bask difE-1 ty of the anti-Japanese struggle 
lia in the fact that Japanese impendism has had great 
experience In espionage and diversion, experience in de 
ception, bribery and intrigue against the oppressed 
peoples. In the c o w  of decades the Japan- military 
political intelligence service ("Special Service Depart- 
ment") hag sumded in planting its numerous agents: 
spies, divmionhts, terrorists and provocateum in all the 
more or less important military, strategic and politid 
points and organizations of China, including a section 
of higher political and military circles. Many of these 
agents deliberately refrain from activity for the time 
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being, awaiting the opportune moment to strike a telling 
blow at the most vital points. 
Finally, the fourth basic weakness lies in the fact that 
because of the countrfs economic backwardness, financial 
poverty and extremely limited means of communication, 
the Chinese troops wilI experience shortages and hitches 
in the flaw oE atms, ammunition and provisions and it 
will be hard to send up reinforcements and to secure the 
swift and timely mobility and maneuvering capacity of 
the troops, etc. 
Yes, the dificulties and weaknesses of semi-colonial 
China in the armed struggle with imperialist Japan are 
numerous and extremely serious. And it is therefore the 
task of the Communists and the Chinese' people as a 
whole to Find the means and the murage to overcome 
them. I t  would be a crime before the people to flinch 
from these difficulties and weakness. 
Today the entire Chinese people, save for agents of 
the Japanese, national traitors and hopeless cowards and 
chatterboxes, are no longer faced with the question of 
whether "China must or can offer armed resistance tu 
Japanese aggression." Now China is kced with the one 
question of how to organize this armed resistance and 
how to secure the victory of the Chinese people in this 
difficult but glorious struggle for national liberation. 
HOW IS THE NAmONWTDE ARMED RESISTANCE OF THE 
CHINESE PEOPLE M BE ORGANIZFJI AND HOW fS 
ITS VICTORY TO BE S E C U ~ D ?  
According to the information of the foreign and the 
Chinese press horn the moment of the Lukouchiao events 
to the beginning of military operations by the Japanese 
troops in Shanghai, that is, prior to August 14, the Kuo- 
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mintang and the central Nanking government adopted 
the following measures in the interests af organizing re- 
sis tance to the new acts d Japanese aggression: 
I .  Between one hundred and one hundred and fdty 
thousand men were mobilized in Hopei, Chahar and 
Shantung to strengthen defense and to help the 29th 
Amy.  
a. The Iirst conference of national defense was called. 
3. An order was pubhhed reinstating Chang Hsueh- 
liang (leader of the Manchurian army) as general, and 
readiness was expressed to reinstate General Tsai Ting- 
kai (Commander of the 19th Army) in his post of 
command. 
4. Under pressure of public protest headed by Madame 
Sun Yat-sen the seven arrested leaders of the "All-China 
Association of National Salvation" were freed. 
5. Work was begun on military defenses in the dis- 
tricts oE Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhan, etc. 
6. Commanders for the various fronts were appointed, 
Chiang Kai-shek as Commander-in-Chief of all the Nan- 
king troops and Commander of the First Army, on the 
front along the Peipiq-Hankow Railway; Fmg Yu- 
hsiang, Commander of the Second Army, on the front 
along the Timtsin h k o w  Railway; Yen Hsi-shan, Com- 
mander of the Third Army, on the S h i S u i y u a n  
h n t .  
It must be acknowledged that although thee meas- 
ures of the Kuomintang and the Nanlciig government 
do not yet meet the requirements of the situation and do 
not satisfy the country's defense needs, they are, never- 
theless, a big step forward by comparison with the p i -  
tion and poliiy of the Kuomintslng and the Nanking 
government in the recent past. 
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Only after the Japanese attack on the Shanghai-Nan- 
king district did the Kuomintang and the Nanking gov- 
ernment begin more serious armed mistance to Japanese 
n p s i o n .  The near future will show whether t h ~  KUO- 
inintang and the Nanking government, with the present 
composition of their leadership, will be able to organize 
this resistance consigtentIy to a victorious finish. We 
Communists earnestly h o p  that the Kuomintang and the 
Nanking government, after fully o v e r c d g  the repist- 
ance o l  the pro-~apanese elementrs, will lead the mud 
struggle against the Japanese invaders to a victorious 
finish, together with us and together with the whole 
Chinese people. 
The Communist Party of China for its part, deeply 
aware of its responsibility for the fate of the working 
class and of the entire Chinese people, has pers$tently 
advocated the slogan "Expel Japanese imperialism £ran 
China," which it advanced at the very beginning of 
Manchurian events in 1931, and, step by step, beginning 
with the Manifesto of August, 1935, and ending with 
I he latest declarations regarding events in North China, 
it has offered concrete proposals, based on the policy of 
creating a single national anti-Japanese front by means 
ol which the Chinese people will not only offer serious 
a~metl resistance to Japanese aggression but will secure 
the victory. 
What concrere proposals and demands do the Chinese 
Communists advance in their declarations and appeals? 
First, "thc col laboralion of all anti-Japanese parties 
at~d groups of China on the basis of the colIabo~+ation 
of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, to resist 
lapan and save the country." The collaboration of all 
parties and groups in China, based on a political agree- 
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ment as regards the common struggle against the com- 
morI enemy, assumes the reten tion of their politid and 
organizational independence by all the parties to the 
agreement: the Kuominmng, the Communist Party and 
other political organizations. 
Indeed, according to the Iatest reports in the foreign 
press the ccihboration between the Kuomintang and the 
Communist Party is making rapid p-if this is true 
we must welcome i t  in every way. But in the interests of 
the Chinese people as a whole we must frankly advise 
certain leaders of the Kuomintang to abandon their mis- 
taken efforts to transform collaboration between the 
Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China into the 
po l i t id  and organizational subordination of the Com- 
munist Party to the Kuomintang. They must also aban- 
don their mistaken policy of ignoring the other anti- 
Japanese political groups and organization ksides the 
Communist Party and the Nanking Kuomintang. They 
must recognize the necessity of forming a united front 
with these groups and organizations and give up their 
efforts to make coIlaboration with these groups involve 
their forcible subordination to the Kuomintang and the 
Nanking government. 
Such an attitude on the part of certain Nanking 
Ieaden to the solution of this question that is vital to the 
country and the people only binders and delays the fom- 
ation of a single anti-Japanese national front composed 
of all the truly popular forces of China. Deliberately or 
otherwise, these leaders hinder the work of organizing 
real armed resistance to the Japanese aggmsor and play 
1 
into the hands of the latter. 
Second, "the formation of an allChina government of 
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national defense and a singIe all-China democratic re- 
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public." There are now reports to the effect that the 
Kuomintang intends in the near future to reorganize the 
Nanking government in this d k t i o q .  Thia is very well 
and we a n  only welcome it. But to hasten this work we 
must thoroughly ex& various slanderous legends and 
wrong arguments. First of all the legends spread by pro- 
Japanese elements to lhe effect that the slogan €or the 
formation of an all-China government of national defense 
means the overthrow of the existing central Nanking 
government is utterly false and unfounded. It is slander 
and provomtion! At the present time only the Japanese 
qgmmr arid his agents are interesred in the overthrow 
of the. Nanking government. 
We Chinese Communists openly dedare that we sup- 
port the Kuomintang and the Nanking government and 
that we will fight Japanese imperialism together with 
them shoulder to shoulder. 
A wrong and scho1asdc assertion is made by certain 
incorrigible chatterboxa to the effect that the slogan for 
the formation of an all-China government of national 
defense means the Eonnation of a government which 
must necmarily awume the title of all-China govem- 
ment of national defense and that othemise it will nat 
be such a government. Formalists! It is not a question 
of names but of essence1 The assertions of chose who say 
that the existing Nanking government has long s ine be- 
come an all-China government of national defense are 
also incorrect. No, the Nanking government has only 
now partially begun to carry out the mks of national 
defense. But it has not yet become a truly allChina 
'government of national defense such as the military situ- 
ation warrants and such as all advocates of a united anti- 
Japanew national front demand. 
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The Nanking national government nl~tst bccomc a 
truly allChina government d national defense and it 
can, provided it wges its policy in the direction of a 
(letermined struggle for national. independence, for the 
democratization of the regime and the improvement or 
the material conditions of the masses, by removing pro- 
Japanese elenhenu from the government and by drawing 
into the government the m l y  authoritative militant anti- 
Japanese leaders from the respective parties, groups aria 
organizations, as the situation warrants and in conform- 
ity with the wishes of the latter. 
Only this type of authoritative and frghting govern- 
ment, tagether with the convening of an all-China parlia- 
ment based on universal suErage and universal d m  
cratic liberties, can truIy cope with the responrible, 
difficult and complex task 01 national defense, with which 
it is entrusted by qm,mo,c~w, people. Only this type ot 
d-China government of national defense can secure the 
universal mobilization of a 1  the military, human and 
economic forces of the whole country for the sacred 
armed struggle of the entire Chinese people against the 
Japanese aggressor. 
The immediate liberation of all political prisaners, 
the repeal of all anti-popular and antidemmtic laws, 
the further amendment of the laws and conditions that 
govern the convening of the National .Uembly, the 
radical alteration of the d d t  of the Constitution of the 
Chinese Republic, the immediate inwoduction of broad 
dcrnocratic liberties for all citizens (with the exception of 
national traitors and Japanese agents), in a word the 
transformation of China into a truly united allGhini 
republic-these measures will swiftly and effectively 
facilitate the establishment of mutual trust between the 
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people and the government and thereby increase China's 
power of national defense many times. 
Third, the "unived mobilization of all military di- 
visions and the formation of a united allChina anti-Jap 
anese army." A successful armed ~rn-e against the 
Japanese aggressor requires the universal mobilization of 
all-China's military divisions and for this it is necessary 
to form an a1bChina united anti-Japanese army by 
uniiing all the armed form of China, i.e., all the central 
Nanking armies, all the provinaal armies, the anti-Jap- 
anese people's Red Army, the Manchurian anti- Japanese 
people's armies, etc., with a single -and, a single: 
discipline, a single system of supplies and armaments and 
a single militay plan for coordinating operations against 
the common enemy. 
The Nanking government and Chiang Kai-shek have 
to a degree undertaken to form such an army. We natur- 
ally welcome this step. The Red Army and its command- 
ing and political statf, led by the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China, has often confirmed its 
sincere readin= to enter the all-china united national 
revolutionary army as a component paxt, not only in 
words but in deeds. 
But the formation of a united allChina army has long 
been delayed because in recent years when the mutual 
struggle had alrestdy virtually ceased, certain leaders of 
the Nanking Army and certain Nanking politicians 
sought to utilize the slogan of the formation of a united 
national anny in order to weaken and reduce the fighting 
strength of the anti-Japanese national Red Army. For 
example, they demanded the resignation of the f o m t ,  
m a t  capable leaders and organizers of the Red Army, 
Comrades Chu Teh and Mao Tsemng, the reduction 
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and curtailment of the size of the anti-Japanese people's 
Red Army, the removal of all s t d €  leaders of d l  the 
divisions of the Red Army and the appointment of 
others, etc. Does this correspond to the general interests 
of the strumle against Japan and the cause of forming 
a united national army? 
According to the latest information the Nanking gov- 
ernment and the Kuornintang have already withdrawn 
several of their demands and the Red Army, in order 
to hasten the formation of the united Chinese Army ancl 
further the common sm&gIe of the anti-Japanese Eront, 
has already officially complied with the ordem of Nan- 
king on the appointment of its commanding staff and on 
the designation of the Red Army as a part of the na- 
tional revolutionary army. 'This is a big step forwad in 
the formation of a united allChina army. 
Another serious obstacle to the formation of a united 
people's revolutionary army is the fact that some of the 
Nanking leaders have attempted, in the name of the 
formation of a united national revolutionary army, to 
weaken the strength of the locaI troop, while at the same 
time a m i o n  of the local military leaders, who have 
long been accustomed to regard their troops as their 
"psonal  capital," are reluctant to merge their military 
forces with the united alI-China anti-Japanese m y .  We 
must frankly tell these miIitsuy Ieadeni in the mtet and 
in the localities that at the present time the nrtiod self- 
consciousness of all the fighters in the Chinese Army is 
constantly increasing. 
Tlky d i z e  that their sacred duty lies not in p m -  
ing blind obedience to "their generals," but in mnsdou~ 
ly performing the glorious task of defending the country 
and the- peopIe. Significant in this connection is the be- 
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havior of the 38th Division of the 29th Army during the 
recent events, when its commander Chang Tsudung, 
a pwJapanese agent, refused the request of his officers 
and soldiers that he order the division to resist the Jap- 
anese troops. Against the will of its commander the 38th 
Division, under the command of the best officers, volun- 
tarily went in a body to assist the 97th Division in de- 
fending the Peiping-Tientsin dishict from t he  Japanese 
aggressor. 
This is the ideal time to test all the military leaden 
of China. If under the present conditions anyone proves 
himself a traitor and a coward, if anyone opposes action 
against the Japanese, he will be despised by everyone 
as an unworzhy military leader, as an unworthy son of 
his country. 
Fourth, "universaI ~nobilization of the entire Chinese 
people," China's military force alone is far from enough 
for a truly successful armed struggle against Japanese im- 
perialism. What is needed is the universal mobilization 
of the entire able-bodied Chinese population, of all men 
and women, young and old, for a ct,mmon struggle to 
attain a common goal. 
The line of the Communist Party, which was expressed 
in its appeal of August 1 (1935)~ must become the direc- 
tive of mobilization: "Let those who have much money 
give their money; let those who have much arms furnish 
their arms; let those who have bread and rice give their 
bread and rice; let those who have g o d  health give their 
strength a d  energy unsparingly; Iet those who have 
special training utilize their training. LRt the entire'peo- 
ple be mobilized in this manner!" 
Fifth, "the universal arming of the whole Chinese 
people." The military operations of rhe Japanese avia- 
80 
tion, infantry and naval forces have already shown with 
fuU clarity that in modern warfare the rear differs little 
from the front. Therefore we must arm our people with 
dl the available weapons, that they shall not only be in 
a podtion to defend themseIva at any place and at any 
time fram the surprise attacks of the Japanese and their 
agents but may also provide the necessary aid to our troops 
on the front and carry on partisan d a r e  and diversionist 
work in the enemy's rear and on his flanks, etc. Right nAw 
thc Nanking government and the local authorities must 
first of all arm the milIions of working people of Shang- 
hai, Tienain, Pciping, Hangchow, Wuhan, Tsingtaa and 
other big cities of the country as well as the peasant 
masses of the nurthern provinces, the KiquGhekiang 
and Fukien-Kiangsi districts. The combinatian of the 
auxiliary operations of the armed masses with the mili- 
tary operations of the mops on the basis oE a general 
milimy plan is the only way to secure the expulsion of 
the Japanese invad'm from China. 
Sixth, "univerrsal mobilization of the country's entire 
economy and the adoption of an economic policy of na- 
tional defense." Anyone can see the tremendous impox- 
. lance of the universal mobilization of all the country's 
economic, financial and raw material resources in modern 
warfare. Th i s  task is especially urgent in China, which 
is backward economically and which must wage a long 
and drawn-out war on a vast scale with Japanese im- 
perialism. In this connection we Chinese Communists 
still have a lot of serious work to do together with our 
ally, the Kuomintang, in order to mobilize and organize 
the country's entire economy in conformity with the 
requirements and conditions of national defense. 
Seventh, "searing and improving the material an- 
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dition of the masses." The masses of China live in pov- 
erty, every year millions perish from hunger, floods. 
drought and other calamities. The chatter about the 
alleged impossibility of any form of improvement in the 
Iiving conditions of the masses during the war-time must 
be discarded as a pernicious theory. Yes, in wax-time it 
is difficult to improve the materid cmditions of the 
 mass^& During the nationwide defensive suuggle people 
must endure great sacrifices. But the provision of elemen- 
tary living condi tians, t he improvement of the intolerable 
situation of the working rnasses during the nationwide 
armed struggle, is noL only possible but is absolutely 
necessary in the interests of the struggle. 
At the present time hundreds of thousands of Chinese 
workers and employees who were previously employed 
in the Japanese enterprises have left their situations in 
sign of protest and as a boycott of the national enemy. 
But unempIoymeat means hunger. 1s it impossible to 
provide tbese hundreds of thousands of vanguard fighters 
with a livelihood? Of course it is pmsible. 
This year in many districts of &na the peasants again 
suffer from drought and crop failure. Is it imposible to 
give elementar). aid to the starving and impoverished 
peaants? Of course it is possible. We must also give s p -  
tematic aid to the many millions of unemployed and 
impoveridwd artisans, ctc 
Eighth, "the adoption of a policy of national defense 
education and of aid to the unemployed and illirerate 
yonth." China has tens of millions of illiterate workers 
and peasants, and the system of edu~ation is far from 
satisfying either the requirements of the students them- 
selves or those of the state. Therefore in recent years 
China has witnessed a big, mass movement of the youth, 
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led by the best and outstanding scientific and educational 
kaders, advoating a policy of national defense educa- 
tion and of aid to the unemployed and illiterate youth. 
The main objectives of this movement are the fol- 
lowing: 
I. The improvement of the educational system in the 
direction of developing the national consciousness of the 
youth and its determination to fight against the foreign 
enemy for the salvation of the country; 
2. The reorganization of the educational system to 
mdom with the requirements of national defense and 
the training of specialists in the various fields, 
3. Freedom of conscience and of study, struggle against 
the compulsory training of the youth in the spirit of 
ideas that are hostile to the people and to the nation; 
4. Military training for the youth and the students; 
5. The provision oE work for those who have finished 
their studies and aid to students, etc 
The Communist Party of China fully endorses this 
movement of the youth and the best section of the 
Chinese intelIectuals, and it has included these demands 
in its own general program for a united national front 
of resistance t Japan and for Lhe salvation oE the 
country. 
Ninth, "confiscation of all the property of the Jap 
m e  aggressor and his agents and the datruction of 
Japanese spies and national traitors." The conbation 
of all the property of the Japanese aggressor and his 
agents will deprive our enemies of an economic founda- 
tion in China; the means thus confismted will go to 
defray a part of the military expenditures and to pn>- 
vide aid for the anti-Japanese fighters and their families. 
I t  is generally recognized that Japanese agents infest 
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the state, military and party apparatus of the Kuomin- 
tang and of other organizations, centrally and locally. 
If the Kuomintang and the Nanking government have 
definitely decided to wage an armed struggle with the 
Japanese aggressor they musi not auow their apparatus 
to be infested by Japan- agents, especially in its most 
responsible links. And if thk be true why do those open 
and dastard1 y traitors of the Chinese people, the Trntsk y- 
itcs, s!ill carry on their filthy, subversive, diversionist and 
spying work on behail oE the Japanese secret service, 
with impunity, in Shanghai, Nanking, Sian and else- 
where? For i t  is a generally known and incontrovertible 
fact that the Chinese Trotskyites are employed by the 
Japanese secret service. 
Is not 111e counter-revolutionary slogan to the effect 
that China's main enemy is not Japanese imperialism 
but the Co~nmunist Party of China and the AII-China 
Association of National Salvation directly dictated by 
the Japan= secret service? 
Is not the Trotskyite slogan of "an alliance with Japan 
for the stn~ggIe againis t the Communist Party and Chiang 
Kai-shek" a direct appeal of the Japanese aggressor to 
destroy the Communist Party and the Kuomintang? 
Is not the Trotskyite line "on the necessity of waging 
the national, revolutionary war in China not onIy against 
Japanese impridism, but at rhe same time, against 
all the imperialist powers" directed towards isolating 
China from Europe and her im,  in order to facilitate 
the Japanese seizure of China? 
Is not the Trotskyite propaganda of the notorious 
anti-leninist theory on the impossibility of national rev+ 
lutionary wars in the period of imperialism, plus the 
ft~rious attacks of the Japanese-Trotskyite agents an the 
54 
slogan of die Chinese Communist Party for a national 
revolutionary war against Japanese imperialism, a k t  
fulfilment of the Japanese instructions to preach the 
"theory d nan-resistance" in China? 
Is not the Trotskyite slogan on the "necessity of simulta- 
neously waging a civil war against the i n m d  enemy and 
a national revolutionary war against the external enemy" 
and the "impossibility and inadmhability of any united 
fmnt between the Communist Party mct the Kuomin- 
tang" a cynical application of the Japanese policy of 
"conquering Chino with the hands of the Chinese them- 
selves," and of not letting the national f o m  of China 
unite far the common struggle against Japanese aggm- 
sion under any conditions? The late national writer Lu 
Hsen was profoundly c o r n  when he- declared that "Jap- 
anese imperialism entirely welcomes the views of the 
Trotskyites in China" 
During the Sian events the Japanese Trotskyite agents 
headed by the bandit C h q  Mu-tao made every efEort 
. to stir up war between Nanking and Sian. These same 
agents subsequently killed General Wmg I-tse, a famous 
national hero who was the fint member of the high 
command of the Chinese army openly and honestly to 
establish the united anti-~a~anese front with the Com- 
munist Party and the Red Army. 
The Trotskyites, headed by the thrice-accursed rene- 
gades Huang Pirtg and Chang Mu-tao, receive $ ~ , o o o  
a month from the Japanese secret service in North China 
to organize a so-called "new party" and to carry on their 
wrecking work. The Tmtikyite representative Chang 
Mu-tao wa9 included in the w-caIled delegation of friend- 
ship with Japan and went to Tokyo with the letter. The 
II'rotdyi~& Shieh Nuonahan, Cheng Hsiao-cba and the 
blood-thirsty murderer Jen Tso-bum (alas Yeh Ching) 
pubIish special papers and magazines, with Japanese 
money, which spread aIl kinds of slander against the 
Communist Party, the Kuomintang and the anti-Japa- 
nese mass organizations. 
Do not all thm facts prove the full correctness of our 
great writer Lu Hsen who said that "by their conduct 
the Trotskyites are unworthy to be modern Chinew"? 
Do not all thee facts show that the Trotskyites by agree- 
ment wit11 the Japanese secret service are helping Japa- 
nese imperialism to seize China? Do not these facts prove 
that the Trotskyites are not onIy the enemies of the 
Communist Pany, but the enemies of the whole Chinese 
people? 
AU theae facts fully confirm the words of the great 
leader of all working humanity, Comrade Stalin, to the 
d e c t  that modern "Trotskyism . . . has changed . . . into 
a frantic and unprincipled gang of wreckem, diversion- 
ists, spia~ and murderers acting on the instructions d the 
intelligence services of foreign states."* 
The Chinese people and international public opinion 
will judge the extent to which the Kuomintang and the 
Nanking government, as well as the local military and 
political authorities, are determined and prepared for 
armed struggle with the Japanese aggmsor, by their 
attitude towards all Japanese agents and national traitors. 
including the Japanese-Trotskyite fascist agents. The 
government and the people of the U.S.S.R. have given 
us an exarnple of how to fight against the foreign inteL 
ligence service and purge the state military and Party 
* Jawph Stalin, Mastering Bolshcuisrn, p. 14. Worken Library 




apparatus of these vermin, thereby strengthening its de- 
fenses and securing its rear in case of an attack by for- 
eign aggressors. 
Tagether with the above nine slogans and fhe de- 
mands on internal policy, the Communist Party also 
advanced the slogan on che "adoption of an anti- 
Japanese foreign policy." The Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China and the Central Execu- 
tive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republi~ in their 
appeal of August I, 1935, proposed a spedal point on 
foreign policy which 4 1 s  for "the establishment of con- 
tact with all peoples that are hostile to Japanese imperi- 
alism (with the Japanese working people, the Koreans, 
Form&, etc.), for a -on ~truggle against the com- 
mon enemy, the estabSuhment of an alliance with all 
nations and states which support and sympathize with 
the national s trugale of the Chinese people and of cordid 
relations with a11 powers and nations which maintain a 
Eriendly neutrality in the miIi tary operations between 
Japanese imperialism and the Chinese people." 
And in one of its latest declaratiom regarding events 
in Northern China the Central Commit tee of the Chinese 
Communist Party p r o m  to the Nanking government 
that i t  immediately adapt an active anti- Japanese foreign 
poiicy, that it sup rt the international peace front and 
that it enter all o m  of agreements with other coun- 
.._ 
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tries which would benefit the cause of the anti-Japanese 
struggle. 
The appliation of the b e  measures in the sphere 
of internal and foreign policy will not only enable the 
Chinese people to organizc truly nationwide armed resis- 
tance, but to ~ecure the victory over the Japanese 
aggressor. 
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THE TASltS OF THE CObdMUNlSt PARTY OF CHINA 
UNDER PRBSEMT CONDmONS 
The struggle of the Chinese people is entering a new 
period-the period of the direct organi~atioa of su- 
ful nationwide armed resistance to Japanese aggression. 
If in the preceding period the main task was to end 
the civil war in the country on behalf of a unanimous 
smuggle against Japan= imperialism, now, when the 
armed struggle with the Japanese aggressor h a  already 
begun, the main task is to organize the nationwide armed 
resistance to the point of the complete expulsion of the 
Japanese invaders from China 
If in the preceding period the Commu J s t  Party of 
China only succeeded in laying a oertain foundation for 
the establishment of a united anti-Japanase front with 
the Kuomintang and with other organizations, it is now 
directly fighting for the speedy and the complete forma- 
tion of this united national anti- Japanese front, through 
the establishment of collaboration of pol i t id  parties 
and organizations and the creation of a united aIl-China 
democratic xepublc with an all- government of 
national defense and a united aUChina anti-Japanae 
army* 
~i previously the question of the organization of suc- 
cessf ul nationwide military res$ tance to Japanese ag- 
gression still faced the Communist Party in perspective, 
today it has become the immediate and urgent task. 
And from this it follows that if previously che Commu- 
nht Party of China concentrated its attention and its 
work for the most part on the Red Army and the Soviet 
districts and relied mainly on their forces, at the present 
time our Communist Party must not only concern itself 
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with strengthening and increasing the forces of the Red 
Army; it must also see to it that the best traditions and 
lighting qualities trf the latter, as h e  mtwt advanaed, 
d i~ ip l ind,  and compact component part of the all-China 
army, are preserved. The Communist Party of China will 
not only be concerned with improving work in the So- 
viet districts so as to make them a buttress of the anti- 
Japanese struggle, but, relying on the growing revolu- 
tionary strength and might of the millions of working 
p p l e  aU over China, it wilI stmggle to mnsform other 
districts throughout the muntry into strong foundations 
for the a l l a i m  democratic republic. 
This means that in the first phce the Communist 
Party of China must devote tremendous &OK to the 
education and organization of the working class miUions, 
who at the present t d e  are again beginning to take an 
active and open part in the anti-imprialist struggle 
of national liberation as the must advanoed, the most 
chs-conscious and the most consistent detachment of 
the entire Chinese people. 
TThe Chine Communists realize that work among 
the workers and among the made unions in the main 
centen of the muatry WBB extremely weak in the previous 
period. Now, however, as a result of the growing class 
consciousness and organization of the working class and 
its activity and initiative, the mass in0uene and the 
base of the Communist Party gruw and strengthen md 
the nationwidt struggle against the Japanese aggressor 
will become more and more powetIul. 
Second, t h e  Communist Party of China is faced with 
the task of organizing and dmwing the b r d  p e m t  - which comprise the ovemheIming majority of 
the Chinese people into the nationwide and general 
-20 
democratic struggle. The Chinese Communists realize 
that for all their rich experience of work among peasants, 
save in those districts where the Red Army was or now is, 
they have on the whole done very little to organize the 
peasants. Yet the more broadly and the more e h i v e l y  
the peasant masses are organized and the more actively 
they are involved in rhe revolutionary struggle, the 
stronger will be the anti-Japw national liberation 
movement and the mom -in its s u d u l  issue. 
Third, the Communist Party of China is f a d  with 
the task of strengthening a d  extending its work among 
the Chinese youth in general and among the student 
youth in particular. The Chinese Communists realize 
that work among the youth is especially weak. The 
Chinese youth are deeply imbued with the spirit of 
national liberation; they take their stand heroidly and 
devotedly on the front line oE the  anti-Japanese struggle 
and they are destined to play an important role in 
the struggle of the Chinese people for national lib- 
eration. 
Fourth, the Communist Party of China is faced with 
the task of organizing its rnembe~s and all honest rev- 
lutionary elements in all sections of the national revolu- 
tionary m y  in order to raise the fighting spirit d the 
army and suengihen revolutionary military disciplne, 
to provide examples of heroism and s e l f h f i a e  and to 
secure the mutual moperation of the people and the 
army in the hard but historic struggle with the mortal 
enemy. 
Fifth, the Communist Parry of China is faced with 
the task of strengthening its influence and its work in 
Manchuria and Jehol, The Communist Party can be 
proud of the fact that Communists, despite great hard- 
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ships and tremendous sacrifices, work and struggle in 
Manchuria and Jehol. 
In the fulfilment of its great historical revalutionary 
tasks our Chinese Communist Party inevitably encoun- 
ters many difficrulties. These dif16culties are connected 
with the need for c;urying on- 
". . . the struggle against Japanese imperialism, armed as i t  
id to the teeth-a crafty enemy which is dwerly dipming 
the form of China and malting use of every inte.rna1 struggle 
in this wuntry for its uwn robber en&."# 
These difficuIties also arise from the fact that in China 
there exist certain representatives of the propertied 
classes, who like the French bourgeois leaders in the 
period of the FrancoPrussian war of 1 8 7 ~  1, place Lhe 
selfish  interest^ of their classes above their nationd duty, 
who readily commit national treason and who, under 
certain conditions, will assist the foreign fm in his 
struggle against the Chinee working class, against the 
Chinese people. 
"But there are also internal -ti= in the path of the 
Communist Pgrty of China. It has to overcome the resistance 
of sectarian dements, who do not undmtand that in the 
prcrent conditions thc only way to secure the liberation of the 
C h i n e  people is that of establishing a united national front 
against the Japanese violators. It a h  bm to on a 
auuggle agairsnr the opportunist opitulators who are m d y  ra 
sacrifrw the political and organizational independence of the 
Party and the Red Army, and to disoIw them in other 
organizadona"* 
The first difficulty of an inner-party nature is con- . Tha Communist httrrnational, Octok,  1936. Georgi 
Dimi troff, "The Fifteenth Ar~tliversary of tbe Communist Party 
of China " 1939. 
** ~ i 8 ; p .  r l (o .  
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nected with the fact that in recent years ~ h c  Chinese 
Co~nmunist Party has made a sharp palitid turn, such 
as was scarcely experienced by m y  other section of the 
Cornintern. Instead of the previous armed struggle with 
the Kuomintang, the Communist Party now fights for 
co:oUaboration with the Kuomintang and the other organi- 
zations. Instead of the dviI war of the Red Army with 
the Kuomintang and non-Kuomintang troops which 
lasted for nearly ten years, the Communist Party n m  
struggles for the unification of the Red Army with all 
other Chinese troops in a united allChina national rev* 
Iutionaty army. f nstead of the previous a d  struggle 
for the overthrow 01 the Nanking government and the 
establishment of an ail-China Soviet government the 
Communist Party now fights for the formation of a single 
all-China government together with the Kuomintary: and 
the Nanking government, for the formation of a united 
a U a i a a  democratic republic with an all-China govern- 
ment of national defense. 
At the same time the Communist Party openly wi&- 
d m  its slogan d the Sovietization of China at the 
present stage of the struggle of the Chinese peapie. 
Although so far the Communist Pany is making this 
political turn with comparative s u m  it would be 
wrong to say that its ranks do not still include a consider- 
able number oE people who, because of the sharpness of 
the turn, are caught in the snares of ideologiwl con- 
fusion and practical error. Now more than ever before 
the Communist Party must wry on a most serious 
idmlogial struggle and improve the Marxist-Leninist 
theore tical training of its forces. 
T h e  Chinese Communists, like true sons of their 
people, rake their stand on the front lines, in defense 
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of China's national exhence and national independence, 
but this does not mean that the Chinese Communists 
have been transformed into bourgeois nationalists or 
that they have been b l v e d  in the ranks of the latter. 
There always has been and always will be an impassable 
barrier benveen the Cammunis~ and the bourgeois 
nationalists. While we take a most decisive stand in 
defense of the national interests of our people, we 
remain true revolutionary internationalists and consistent 
proletarian tighten. 
While we d d a m  ourselves, d ~ p i t e  the dilferences in 
principle that exist between communigm and Sun-Yat- 
sen-ism. advocates af the basic revolutionary slogans of 
Sun Yat-sen, of the best revolutionary traditions of the 
Chinese people, we Communists never for an instant 
under any circumstances cease to be true foIlowers of 
the Mamist-kainast teaching. 
While we take our stand under specific historic condi- 
tions for the formation of a united national front with 
the Kuomintang and the other organizations on the basis 
of a common platform for a common struggle against 
a common enemy, we Chinese Communists wilI never, 
under any circumstances, e w n  for an instant, tolerate 
the lass of the political and organizationat independence 
of our own Party, or the roncealment of our own Com- 
munist face and banner. 
"Thc Communist Party of Cbina, while loyally and honestly 
fulfilling Its obliptions acmrding to the agreement undertaken 
fy it repding h e  struggle against the usurpers. docs not in- 
tend to talrc either the path of blind faith in itn allies, or thc 
path of mpitulation.". 
While we actively favor the creation of a united all- 
China democratic republic and the calling of an all- 
China parliament, under the specific historic conditions, 
we Chinese  communist^ are never, under any circum- 
stances, men for an instant, transform& into bourgeois- 
denlocrau ant1 ;ve rlo not &ase to be consistent advncates 
of Soviet power and of socialism. 
The aemd d i 5 d t y  of an inner-Party nature arises 
from the necessity of re-eduating the old Party f w  
in conformity with the new tasks, of training m*d pro- 
moting new Eolres from among cbe activists and leaders 
of ihe m a s  revottttianary movement who have devel- 
opd in recent yeal-s. The majority of the present forces 
oE the Communist Pang of China were u a i d  and 
tempered in the civil war. Many of them are of peasant 
origin. They have had experience in armed suuggle 
against lllc Kuomintang and its armies, but many of 
them llttctly lack experience in the struggle for h e  
masses tlnder conditions where there % neither a Soviet 
power nor a Red Army and have not the remotet. con- 
cept of the working dm movement in big cities. There- 
fore the education of old Party forces in vnformity 
with new conditions and methods of work is a far horn 
easy matter. 
A task of no less importance is the training and pro- 
motion of new forces, primarily from among the work- 
ers. In recent years many activists and leaders uE the 
mass anti-Japanese movement and the strilce suuggle 
have p w n  up and developed. f t  is among them that 
I the Communist Party can and must recruit fresh forms 
and new reserves, its new fighting f-, directly linked 
with the broad masses and possessing new experienca 
of struggle and work. The Party has helped them and 
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will help them, for the Communists value every honest 
and capable son of the people. 
h the process of the national revolutionary atruggIe 
many of the present activists and leaders of the anti- 
Japan- movement will become acquainted with the 
theory and pmctice of Communism; they will  draw 
c l w r  and,cIoser to our Party and will in the near future 
become sons and daughters of the great Communist 
Party. Some d them have already joined the Commu- 
nist Party of China. But not all active participants in 
the anti-Japanese movement a n  be Communists. The 
desire and determination to take part in the anti-Japa- 
nese struggle in themseIves are far from sufficient lo 
warxant being a member of the Communist Party. Com- 
munists are not only fighters in the national revolu- 
tionary movement but cornistent lighters for the libem- 
tion of the working clasa and of a11 working mankind, 
that is, tighten for the dictatomhip of the proletariat, for 
Soviet power and for communism. 
The third difficulty of an inne~Party nature arises 
from the fact that under the preen t condi t ions-the 
cesation of the internal war and the beginning of the 
nationwide armed struggle of defense-the enemia of 
rhe Chinese revolution, and first and foremost the Japa- 
nese secret service, will inevitably double  its &orts 
co penetrate the rant of the Communist Party with its 
agents, provocateum, diversionists, terrorists and wreck- 
ers, who are recruited primarily from among the con- 
d e d  Trotskyites, the fo1lowers of Chen Tu-hsiu, Lo 
Tsian-lung, etc., so as to destroy from within the power 
and strength of the most revolutionary and the most 
military party, of the party which they fear the most, the 
Communist Party of China. This churnstance is all 
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the more dangerous because revolutionary vigilance and 
systematic struggle against p x m t i o n  and apionage 
are extremely weak and insufficient in our Party's ranks. 
The Party organizations, including the leading ones, do 
very little to verify their forces. 
China is passing through the mat serious and the 
most critikl 3 tate in its history. Tremendous difficulties 
stand in the way of the great s-le to organize a na- 
tionwide armed resistance to the J a p e s e  a g g e m x ,  to 
defend China's national existence and the cause of gem 
era1 peace. The entire Chinese people, every political 
I 
party and group, every politid, military and public 
leader of China, is mnfronred today with a audal test. 
The Chinese Communists, true followers of M m, En- 
gels, Lenin and Stalin, the great teachem of the working 
class and of all working mankind, and worthy sons and 
daughters of their people do not flinch from these a- 
culties and will find the way to overcome them. To- 
gether with the entire Chinese people, with the solidarity 
and support of the entire international proletariat and 
of all prog&i~e mankind, the Chinee Communists 
have confidently and definitely e n t d  the big historic 
I battles with Japanese imperialism for a great new, in. dependent, free and happy Chinese Republic! 
The News from China- 
No question a b u t  ibif you dan'l read the *' W d  
dm't know the news from China. 
Aquh and aqdm the wal cabl88 and he spedal carte- 
spondenb of the D d y  W* have been the first to tell America of 
some of the most hamant developments in that qrea! wuntry 
flqhtlnq lor Its freedom. 
- The Daily Wwkor Mm- this news, dlected by h&& ol 
devoted men and women, h u s e  it L not merely a purwyor of 
h b n a t i o n - h u s e  the Wa&u ha a fiqhtfng new-, 
aidfng in the ntrugqIea of the Chinew people as it does in the 
Mica of w k r s  and -P% people everywhere. for w. 
bedom and prasperfty. 
DAILY AND SUMDAY WORKER 
--- 
I Mail Tbis C a p o n  - - 1 Special Offer! 
DAILY AND SUNDAY WORKER By using this spadal 
50 b a t  13ih Street 
1 New York. N. Y. a six-weaks' subscripibn 
1 PI-e send me the Dully cmd Sun- I the M y  and Sunday 
1 day Worker lot six week, as per your ) for only $1- This 
special offer. I endose $1. offer is lor a limited 
I I perlod only. and does not 1 Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 apply b Manhattan mid 
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